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Abstract
Due to its past colonial status, Ireland has strived to oppose its national identity 
to the heritage of British rule as it gradually severed ties with its former rulers. 
Nationalism being a political notion, it is normally reflected in the country’s 
institutions, the latter getting their legitimacy by constitutional means, and this is 
how the national/foreign, and identity/interculturality dichotomies were shaped. 
This paper will examine a particular case of these oppositions in the context of the 
first Republic (1919–1923) whose judicial institutions competed with the existing 
British court system during the War of Independence, under the tutelage of Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s political and philosophical critique of the State (A 
Thousand Plateaus, 1980). It will deal with the setting up of a system of courts, 
called the Dáil Courts, and how they came to represent some sort of Irish identity 
in the making, something that Deleuze and Guattari called a “becoming”, while 
aggregating both British and foreign legal features. The fate of this singular system 
will first be examined as the setting up of a Deleuzian war machine challenging 
the rigid structure of the colonial State apparatus (1919–1920); the second part 
will analyse how the new court system efficiently replaces the old institutions by 
adopting an unusual “rhizomatic” structure (1920–1921); finally, the third part will 
show how the Dáil Courts were absorbed by the Irish Free State’s Apparatus of 
Capture that reinstated a more familiar, traditional Common Law system (1921–
1924). 
Keywords: Dáil Courts – war machine – State apparatus – rhizome – war of 
independence – institution – Dáil Éireann – Common Law
Résumé
En raison de son statut d’ancienne colonie, l’Irlande n’a cessé d’opposer son 
identité nationale à l’héritage britannique au moment où le pays coupait les liens 
institutionnels avec l’ancien occupant. Le nationalisme, notion politique, se reflète 
dans la mise en place d’institutions autonomes légitimées par l’adoption d’une 
constitution, construisant ainsi des dichotomies du type national/étranger, identité/
interculturalité. Le présent article examinera le cas particulier de la mise en place 
d’un système judiciaire autonome lors de la formation de la première république 
irlandaise pendant la guerre d’indépendance (1919–1923), celui des Dáil Courts. 
Ces dernières participèrent de la création d’une identité politique irlandaise, d’un 
« devenir » agrégeant des éléments du droit irlandais et anglais, pour reprendre le 
concept élaboré par Gilles Deleuze et Félix Guattari dans leur critique politique et 
philosophique de l’Appareil d’État (Mille Plateaux, 1980). Le destin de ce système 
singulier sera tout d’abord analysé comme la mise en place d’une « machine de 
guerre » deleuzienne défiant la structure rigide de l’appareil d’État colonial (1919–
1920). La deuxième partie examinera comment ce nouveau système judiciaire 
a remplacé efficacement les institutions existantes en adoptant une forme plus 
inhabituelle, plus «rhizomatique» (1920–1921). Enfin, la troisième partie montrera 
la manière dont l’Irish Free State, issu du Traité Anglo–Irlandais de 1921, a capturé et 
absorbé les Dáil Courts et a adopté un système judiciaire plus traditionnel calqué 
sur celui de la Common Law (1921–1924).
Mots–clés: Dáil Courts – machine de guerre – appareil d’État – rhizome – guerre 
d’indépendance – institution – Dáil Éireann – Common Law
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 I say it to my countrymen, as The Nation said to them in 1843, “You have  
 it in your power to resume popular courts and fix laws, and it is your duty  
 to do so. If you resort in any of your disputes to any but your own judges,  
 you injure yourselves and commit treason to your country”.   
 Arthur Griffith, The Resurrection of Hungary, A Parallel for Ireland (1905)
Introduction
Like most former colonies, Ireland inherited its judicial system from military 
conquest; Common Law superseded the old Brehon tradition that had hitherto 
structured its society up until the Treaty of Limerick was finally signed in 1691 
giving complete control over the destiny of the island to the Crown of England. The 
passing of repressive statutes, known as the Penal Laws, against the Irish Catholics 
enhanced Irish people’s distrust of colonial institutions in general, and justice in 
particular. This was reflected in the verses of the former court poets, reduced to 
the status of itinerant hedge schoolmasters; in his 1780 poem known as Cúirt an 
Mheánoíche [The Midnight Court], Brian Merriman fiercely criticizes the English 
legal system as an instrument of pillaging and theft in the hand of the ruling Anglo–
Irish gentry. The quest for emancipation did not subside with time, and in the 
late 19th century, a literary and cultural revival, combined with political agitation, 
accompanied the 1916 Easter Rising and the War of Independence. Political leaders 
did not all pursue the same agenda, and radical Republicanism, embodied by the 
banned Irish Republican Brotherhood, coexisted with more moderate autonomist 
approaches, like the Home Rule Party, and socialism, as embodied by James 
Connolly’s Socialist Party of Ireland. Arthur Griffith, the founder of Sinn Féin, 
advocated a complete but gradual empowerment of the Irish people by encouraging 
grassroots initiatives that would eventually loosen England’s political control over 
Ireland. His model was the Compromise signed between Hungary and Austria in 
1867 granting the two states equal status within the Austro–Hungarian Empire, 
hardly a call for a complete breakaway from Great Britain. Part of his plan was 
to encourage the setting up of local laws and local courts; this pointed toward the 
redefinition of Ireland’s legal identity and judicial tradition, bearing in mind that 
Common Law had been established for so long that any trace of legal influence 
from the distant Celtic past or of the legal system that operated in Ireland before 
the conquest had been obliterated.
This complete disappearance contrasts with the survival, however precarious, of the 
Irish language and cultural tradition at the turn of the 20th century, the launching 
of the literary revival known as the Celtic Dawn or the renewed popularity of Gaelic 
sports, all of which had been promoted by a generation of scholars, writers and poets 
from the Anglo–Irish middle–class or landed gentry. The paradox of Ireland in the 
wake of its insurrection was that nationalism was supported mostly by members 
of the Ascendancy, who had been educated in the English tradition. Moreover, 
the distinctive Northern Irish identity is undeniably the result of the blending 
of Scottish Presbyterianism, of political loyalty to the English Crown during the 
wars of succession to the throne of Britain, of the systematic Plantation of Ulster 
in the 17th century resulting in a feeling of alienation among the Irish Catholic 
population. One can therefore argue that interculturality had fundamentally shaped 
the intellectual, social and cultural landscape of today’s Ireland; however, it seems 
that the Common Law tradition could neither be offset nor made to harbour any 
trace of interculturality. Yet, in the short period between the beginning of the War 
of Independence in 1919 and the immediate aftermath of the Civil War in 1924, a 
system of courts of law, known as the Dáil Courts, was established by the first illegal 
Dáil Éireann1 parallel to the setting up of the Irish Republican Army which fought 
against the Royal Irish Constabulary and the British troops. It succeeded in hearing 
cases, keeping court registers and carrying out sentences in very troubled times 
while the proceedings of the official Common Law courts were suspended. These 
courts developed across the country as the expression of the people’s will, and they 
disappeared as rapidly as they were set up. One possible explanation for this short–
lived and intense experience may be found in their spontaneous “rhizomatic” nature, 
as analysed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus (1980). The 
authors identified a recurring opposition in all forms of sociopolitical systems, that 
of the “State apparatus” and of the “war machine”. If the former corresponds to 
a static, symmetrical structure based on dichotomies (men/women, work/leisure, 
legality/illegality, etc.), the latter is a nomadic and temporary assemblage occupying 
a smooth, unchartered space out of the reach of state institutions. This analysis will 
serve as a theoretical background to the present contribution, the aim of which is to 
describe the Dáil Courts’ structure and foundational legal principles and determine 
the historical landmarks that punctuated their expansion and demise. 
One can identify three stages in this evolution: the first one, between 1919 and 
1920, fostered the creation of such courts. These were known then as “Sinn Féin 
courts”, and symbolized the endeavour to offset the established British legal 
system, seen as the expression of colonial state power. The second stage (1920–1921) 
saw the Dáil Courts emerging as the expression of a national state in the making, 
and were gradually absorbed, captured by the budding Irish state apparatus in the 
wake of the Anglo–Irish Treaty. Finally, the last stage (1921–1924) witnessed the 
newly established Free State aligning itself along British legal rules. Ireland thus 
chose to uphold the continuity between the two political entities, with the Treaty 
as the pivotal moment when the “war machine” of the revolutionary Dáil Courts 
was absorbed and neutralized.
1  The first Irish Parliament, set up in January 1919 by the Irish nationalists in defiance of British rule.
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I– Setting up a war machine: the Sinn Féin 
courts v. the British state apparatus
1. What is a “war machine”?
This concept is central to the political theory of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari 
as exposed in A Thousand Plateaus (1980) and discussed in later works by Gilles 
Deleuze. It is defined as an assemblage of individuals characterized by its nomadism, 
its mobility, its capacity to morph into different combinations of individuals and its 
opposition to any State apparatus and the control it imposes on its polity. However, 
it should not be assumed that its aim is to conduct warfare, but instead, to depart 
from the social space controlled (“striated”, as the authors put it) by the State and 
move along an unplanned trajectory in a hitherto unchartered (or “smooth”) space 
(Deleuze 1990: 50). Warfare seems to be a possible consequence, rather than the 
cause, of the emerging of a war machine in a revolutionary context. In spite of its 
diversity in form, a war machine is clearly exterior, even in thought, to the State. 
In Ireland in the wake of the war of Independence, what kindled the insurrection 
was the agrarian unrest that was simmering in the West of Ireland, with occasional 
bouts of violence. The matter was political and legal pertaining to land ownership, 
which had passed into the hands of the landed gentry since the imposition of the 
Penal Laws in the 17th century. The land issue was closely linked to a situation akin 
to other colonisation issues, with land seizures and rents that were associated to 
injustice. This prompted the setting up of alternative forms of justice steeped in a 
long tradition that preceded the imposition of the English Common Law, namely 
the Brehon courts; however few accounts of Brehon procedures were reported 
in the aftermath of the complete conquest of Ireland. Nevertheless, alternative 
courts sprang up in the course of the 18th and the 19th centuries, like the Repeal 
Association arbitration courts, the Ribbon Association courts, the Land League 
courts, or the United Irish League courts (Laird 2005: 23). These were of course 
local, unofficial structures that held secret hearings, but insisted on the formality of 
their proceedings. They were war machines in every respect, because they remained 
exterior to a State apparatus that had no legitimacy among the Irish peasantry, while 
reinforcing their own legitimacy by resorting to procedural instruments borrowed 
from the official courts or elaborating on them (Laird: 26). They also followed the 
evolution of the land wars and the successive insurrections that tried to offset 
the Crown’s political supremacy (The United Irishmen in 1798, the Ribbonmen, 
etc.). The Dáil Courts did not come from nowhere, but were probably the first 
court system that flourished locally during troubled times, gained support from a 
fledgling government and were given some official recognition by the revolutionary 
government in Dublin as well as unofficial attention by the Crown forces and 
administration. All these courts shared one common sense of injustice regarding 
the land issue, based on an unfair rent system, a systematic policy of evictions of 
those who could not or would not pay those rents (“rackrent” as they were known), 
and a system of landownership (landlordism) that was increasingly at odds with the 
local situations in the Irish countryside.
2. The land issue
The Irish Land Act 1870, introduced by Prime Minister Gladstone, reformed some 
unfair contractual aspects of land tenancy, which were particularly hard on the Irish 
farmers. One of the purposes of the Act was to give equal rights to Irish and English 
tenant farmers all over the United Kingdom. However, one condition was that 
the rents could be substantially raised, which was agreed by both landowners and 
tenants. The lease was also reduced to one year, and the effects of the Act impacted 
the Irish negatively during the Long Depression of the 1870s. This resulted in a series 
of upheavals, characterized by rent strikes, “cattle drives” and “monster meetings”.2 
This caused  landlords to retaliate by evicting  unwilling tenants from their lands, 
which in turn resulted in a protracted conflict, known as the Land War, between 
the Land League and the police forces, sometimes backed up by the British Army. 
There were some sporadic murders of landlords or of their agents, but the most 
effective means of putting pressure on the landed classes and the British government 
was the boycotting – or ostracizing – of unpopular people.3 At Common Law, this 
was not unlawful and there was no legal remedy against it, since it was implied, 
negatively, in the very right to engage or not in a commercial transaction or in any 
form of socialization. The Land War finally subsided when a series of Acts were 
passed between 1870 and 1909 that gradually granted  tenant farmers more rights 
and entitlements to their freehold and eased off the transfer of property from the 
richer “absentee landlords” to the Irish farmers.4 The rural population of Ireland 
organised itself into an entity that shares some characteristics with the Deleuzian 
war machine, in that it was the result of a grassroots initiative that had loosened 
the grip that the State apparatus had on its “space” represented by land ownership. 
Besides, it was able to adapt to the local context, unlike the State institutions that 
 
2  Cattle belonging to landowners were occasionally refused grazing on the tenants’ holdings and 
moved along the roads, with no access to water or hay. “Monster meetings” were huge rallies gathering 
hundreds of angry farmers, usually addressed to by a member of the Land League, founded by Michael 
Davitt in 1879. Its aim was to struggle for fairer rent, fixity of tenure and free sale of land to tenant 
farmers (the “Three Fs”). The first meeting took place in 1879 in Claremorris in Co. Mayo.
3  The name comes from a landlord’s agent called Charles Boycott. The idea was not to engage in 
commerce with the designated person or his family, to shun them. It was a voluntary act, and the aim 
was clearly punitive. Whoever broke a boycott became also the target of ostracism or other forms of 
shunning.
4  The most notable ones were the Ashbourne Act of 1885 giving tenants the right to buy their free-
hold, and the Wyndham act of 1903 that allowed this purchase through UK loans.
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followed rules and procedures upheld by the courts. This swiftness and adaptability 
became the norm when the War of Independence broke out. What characterized 
this conflict was the determination with which the insurgents engaged in the 
destruction of state institutions and symbols, and replaced them with a budding, 
mobile and efficient military system, and a fledgling Government comprising a 
clandestine Cabinet, an illegal parliament, and an outlawed court system. This was 
mainly the result of the Irish Volunteers’ military and governmental activity across 
the country.
3. The Volunteers’ “rhizomatic” network and the boycott of the 
established courts
By 1916, Sinn Féin, a hitherto minority party promoting a vague nationalist 
agenda, turned out to be a household name for the liberation of Ireland, as the 
confrontation between bands of angry men and women and law enforcement troops 
spiralled into violence (Kotsonouris 1994: 18). In January 1919, the feud took a more 
radical turn when a local group of armed men assassinated, on its own initiative, 
officers from the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) in Soloheadbeg in Co. Tipperary. 
This was the first spectacular episode in a long series of attacks on police barracks 
by IRA Volunteers and”flying columns”, which became official IRA policy as of 
January 1920. This type of organisation can be described as a “pack–” or “band–like” 
assemblage, both flexible in numbers and characterized by its speed and mobility, 
something reminiscent of the Deleuzian war machine (1980: 360–61).
In local towns the role of the Volunteers was to maintain public order, thus replacing 
the RIC whose depleting forces were no longer able to do so. This was particularly 
the case in the West of Ireland, in counties Clare, Mayo and Sligo for example. 
Parallel to guerrilla actions, local papers increasingly voiced the growing nationalism 
of the population as the official response became increasingly severe, with the 
proclamation of the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) in 1920, which imposed 
martial law in many western districts. What characterized these nationalist feelings 
was the diversity of their sources, which included local farmers, political activists 
and members of the clergy. Regular courts and military tribunals had to deal with 
acts of agrarian vandalism, possession of firearms and other forms of public unrest. 
One interesting fact was that there was general public outcry at all the sentences 
imposed on the offenders (Kotsonouris 1994: 19), and a gradual boycotting of those 
courts.
Indeed, there was a progressive shift from the local courts of Petty Sessions 
judging local disputes, to the setting up of impromptu “People’s courts” under the 
supervision of Sinn Féin’s local leaders and IRA Volunteers, based on a long tradition 
of subversive law and alternative courts or tribunals set up and inaugurated by the 
Land League (Laird: 36) . The aim was political and judicial at the same time: first, it 
became necessary to show that Ireland was ready to take its destiny in its own hands, 
so these newly set up courts became a political instrument; secondly, they expressed 
a grassroots distrust of the established institution of justice which symbolized 
oppression and injustice. Meanwhile, Sinn Féin became a leading political force that 
sent candidates for the General Elections of December 1918 and won 73 seats out 
of 105, in spite of the fact that it was a banned organisation. The British attempt to 
impose conscription in 1918 contributed to the result, after thousands of people had 
signed the Sinn Féin and Cumann na mBan sponsored “anti–Conscription pledges”5 
(McCarthy 2014: 94). General discontent had morphed into a motley reunion of 
varied interests, which even included the landowners, who had appealed to Griffith 
himself (the then Secretary for Home Affairs in the Dáil Cabinet) to help solve the 
land disputes that the courts and the police could not (Kotsonouris 1994: 19). This 
unlikely alliance can be defined along the lines of what Deleuze and Guattari named 
the “rhizome”:
 Multiplicities are rhizomatic[...]. A multiplicity has neither subject nor 
 object, only determinations, magnitudes, and dimensions that cannot 
 increase in number without the multiplicity changing in nature (the laws  
 of combination therefore increase in number as the multiplicity grows)  
 (Deleuze & Guattari 1980: 8).
This rhizomatic nature of the grassroots organisation is indeed reflected in the 
haphazard manner in which the Sinn Féin courts were set up, in the jurisdiction 
they were given, the rules of procedure they adopted, and the clandestine manner 
in which they operated.
4. The first “Arbitration Courts”
The political agenda pursued by Sinn Féin was to show that Ireland was ready to 
take its destiny into its hands and form a viable system of government. This being 
proclaimed illegal by the British authorities forced them to act underground and to 
replace the failing institutions wherever possible; thus the Volunteers started acting 
as police constables in western rural areas (Kotsonouris 1994: 20). Beside their self–
proclaimed powers in investigating offences, the Volunteers pressed for the resort to 
some sort of “rule of law”, by which the communities were locally administered by a 
Sinn Féin leader. Parallel to these power–grabbing initiatives, official judges, justices 
of the Peace as well as Poor Laws guardians either resigned or pledged allegiance 
to the newly elected (and clandestine) Irish government known as the “First Dáil 
Cabinet”. However, the local administration of justice largely escaped the control of 
the revolutionary rulers, as well as the established British government (Kotsonouris 
 
5  Cumann na mBan was the all–female support group for the IRA during the War of Independence.
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1994: 22–23); and if the Dáil had provided for the creation of arbitration courts 
as early as June 1919, these were instead firmly in the hand of the IRA. The latter 
took some measures like policing the local communities, issuing warrants to anyone 
suspected of breaking public order, and concerned themselves with arbitrating local 
land disputes. They were presided by local IRA figures. The courts had jurisdiction 
over parishes and districts, which were the newly–formed administrative units, 
but the composition of their members was completely novel to the traditional 
personnel of justice; indeed members of the clergy usually participated in the 
debates, and women were also deemed eligible to the position of judges. The 
courts thus filled a vacuum, and served also to demonstrate that the budding Irish 
Republic was gradually taking shape and forming a strong political regime that 
would gain credibility in the eyes of the British press as well as high–ranking British 
politicians and MPs (Kotsonouris 2013: 9). The unusual features of those courts 
were their ad hoc nature, the fact that they created a jurisdiction out of the local 
problems that needed attention and authority, irrespective of what a distant and 
sometimes inefficient government might decide. They also resorted to hitherto 
unknown sentences, like banishment from the community, or the restitution of 
land. Somehow it meant that those Sinn Féin courts, which were controlled by 
the war machine of the IRA, were not only defying the British judiciary, but also 
challenging the authority of the civilian government of Dáil Éireann (Kotsonouris 
1994: 23). Some Cabinet members like Austin Stack, Minister for Home Affairs 
in 1920, began to think that the authority of the elected government needed to 
assert itself over the power exercised by the IRA supported by Cathal Brugha in 
the Cabinet; although this was not completely achieved, the government decided 
to move one step further in administering justice in all its areas by establishing the 
local arbitration courts as part of an organized judiciary under the auspices of Dáil 
Éireann.
II– The Dáil Courts (1920–21): from the war 
machine to the Irish State apparatus
1. The First Dáil Éireann
On 21 January 1919, following Sinn Féin’s success at the General Elections of 
December 1918, the first unicameral parliament of the Irish Republic was convened 
at the Mansion House in Dublin. The Sinn Féin candidates had refused to swear the 
oath of allegiance to the British Crown and take their seats at Westminster. They 
met on the same day as the War of Independence officially broke out, as a gesture 
of defiance to the British government. During that first session, the only one that 
was conducted entirely in the Irish language, the Dáil made a formal Declaration 
of Independence, wrote a Message to the Free Nations of the World and, most 
importantly, drafted and voted the first Irish Constitution ever.6 It comprised only 
five articles and was very general and sparse in scope. It nonetheless established 
its first Cabinet on a democratic programme. Cathal Brugha became Ceann 
Comhairle, or President of the Ministry7 along with four Secretaries with a limited 
number of portfolios: Finance, Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs and National defence; 
Arthur Griffith was appointed Secretary for Home Affairs. The situation across the 
country was that of a war, with increasing dangers for those acting on behalf of the 
Dáil and a mounting number of casualties.
On 20 March 1920, de Valera, released from jail was now President of the Ministry 
and, while visiting the United States to get support for the Irish rebellion, he stated 
that the Dáil assumed authority over the IRA, which also acted as the Republican 
Police (Kotsonouris 1994: 26) on behalf of the government. This did not reflect 
the complexity of the situation, since the IRA had a lot of influence over some 
Government members, as it was a key player in the conflict. Cathal Brugha had 
become the Minister for Defence and Austin Stack Minister for Home Affairs on 
16 January 1920. The latter set himself the task of organising a sustainable system 
of courts under the authority of the Ministry. This did change the outlook of the 
Arbitration Courts, which were based on a decree of June 1919, but remained 
largely out of Dáil’s control. This time, the administration of justice, which had 
hitherto been limited to land disputes in the form of arbitration, would include 
broader civil and criminal jurisdiction (Kotsonouris 1994: 29). This was a dramatic 
change, in that the Cabinet was openly challenging the British court system 
in its regal prerogatives. Indeed, arbitration did not compete directly with the 
established Common Law courts, except for the fact that the latter’s activities 
were drastically curtailed due to the boycott to which they were submitted. Any 
impingement on criminal jurisdiction merely consisted of the Volunteers deciding 
the fate of informers and traitors during hearings. Stack’s decision changed the 
situation in a radical manner, because its purpose was political: it aimed to promote 
the legitimacy of the Irish Republican Government in the eyes of the international 
public opinion. Indeed, the furthering of the independentist agenda meant that 
the aspiring new nation had to adopt the forms of government that were widely 
accepted by most democracies, including Great Britain and the United States in 
the context of political negotiations; Sinn Féin’s political propaganda astutely 
confronted the British courts with their contradictions when it came to decide 
cases of alleged terrorist activities involving Irish Volunteers (Margulies 2011: 836 
and Foxton 2008: 381–382).
6  Published online at http://www.firstdail.com/?page_id=51 (accessed 15/02/14).
7  This would correspond to the position of Head of Government, the equivalent of the British 
Prime Minister. The President of the Irish Republic was Eamon de Valera.
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This gradual integration of the Sinn Féin courts (otherwise known as The People’s 
Courts) into State–dominated courts of law had important cultural results. The Sinn 
Féin courts had no particular agenda concerning procedural matters except that 
they should distance themselves from their Common Law counterparts; it really 
meant that they should operate differently in matters of substance and procedure. 
As far as substance was concerned, only the local conditions and disputes dictated 
the courts’ agenda, which explains why the largest number of cases concerned land 
disputes. Since the avowed aim was also to reflect the spirit of the nascent Republic, 
the choice of arbitration was culturally adequate. It was a distant reference to the 
Old Brehon courts, which operated before the English conquest of Ireland. These 
courts heard civil matters and decided cases opposing parties that may or may 
not have been of equal social status. Because of the hierarchical nature of Irish 
society then, matters were settled by means of an elaborate system of compensation 
established on the monetary worth of the litigants, and this included compensation 
for deaths, be they accidental or intentional (Kelly 1988: 214–16). This reminds us 
of the current American separation between the civil and the criminal aspects of a 
given case that can be decided either on the basis of a criminal prosecution, or on the 
basis of a civil claim, or both. In a way, arbitration represented something that was 
deeply rooted in Irish judicial identity, but yet was very inspired by republicanism 
in its French or American form. Somehow the Sinn Féin courts were the direct 
expression of the “government of the people, by the people and for the people” 
that interacted with the cultural legacy of the ancient, pre–conquest legal system. 
As such, it was formed on an ad hoc basis, with procedures that varied from place to 
place, in a very nomadic manner, as Deleuze and Guattari put it when they compare 
the State institutions to a chess board and the nomadic war machine to a game 
of Go: “Go pieces are pieces of a non–subjectified machine assemblage with no 
intrinsic properties, only situational ones” (1980: 353). The impression that the Sinn 
Féin courts had a distinct Irish identity is sustained by the sudden manner in which 
they appeared and found adequate solutions to grassroots issues, while challenging 
an existing state–controlled system. But this situation is invariably unstable, and 
when the Dáil Cabinet decided to take over the administration of justice, it had 
to deal with it on the basis that the courts should be the emanation of a State 
apparatus; in so far as that apparatus was competing for complete power with 
British rule, it initiated a gradual capture of the existing courts, which morphed 
into another intercultural hybrid called the Dáil Courts.
2. The Dáil Courts as intercultural hybrids.
Dáil Éireann enacted two decrees that granted it nationwide authority over the 
local Sinn Féin courts: the first one, issued on 13. May 1920, officially established 
a national Arbitration Scheme as well as an official hierarchy of courts. The legal 
system was to operate on a geographical scale with, at the bottom, Parish Courts 
forming districts (which corresponded to parliamentary constituencies) over which 
a District Court had mainly civil jurisdiction; however, another layer was added 
to the District Courts in the form of three–yearly Circuit Sittings, which “would 
have unlimited jurisdiction both in civil and criminal cases” (Kotsonouris 1994: 30). 
Finally, a Supreme Court in Dublin would serve as the final appellate jurisdiction; 
it also had original jurisdiction in “prerogative writs such as certiorari, prohibition 
and habeas corpus” (ibid: 31).8 The legal terms used to define the courts’ jurisdiction 
signal that entire legal areas had been borrowed from the Common Law tradition. 
It could also take cases on its own accord from the Land Commission, given the 
sensitivity of those matters across the country.
In matters of procedure and jurisdiction, these courts shared many characteristics 
with the official Petty Sessions (for the Parish Courts) and County Courts (for the 
District Courts), for which jurisdiction was determined by the maximum amount 
of damages it could award, just like any Common Law court (Kotsonouris 1994: 
31). However, notable differences concerned the sources of law and the personnel 
of the courts. The applicable law was what the Dáil had enacted as of 21. January 
1919, which eliminated all British statutes and case law, but not legal principles, as 
was mentioned above. Finding some sources of law that would help create a legal 
continuity with the old Irish tradition was politically motivated. In the Code of 
Rules of the Dáil Courts, it was clearly stipulated that “citations may be made to 
any court from the early Irish Law Codes, or any commentary upon them in so 
far as they may be applicable to modern conditions and from the Code Napoléon 
or other codes, the Corpus Juris Civilis,9 or works embodying or commenting on 
Roman law; but such citations shall not be of binding authority. Save as aforesaid, 
no legal textbook published in Great Britain shall be cited to any Court” (Hanna 
J. 1929: 30). The language used in this quote is itself influenced by the Common 
Law, especially with terms like “binding authority” (a reference to the doctrine of 
Stare Decisis), “applicable to modern conditions”, “cited to any court”, which was 
not surprising, considering that many of the leading drafters of the Dáil decrees 
and Dáil representatives had been legally trained at Inns of Courts. The attempt 
to rid Ireland of all traces of Common Law necessitated the reference to other 
sources of law that had equal prestige (Code Napoléon or Corpus Juris Civilis), thus 
making the Irish legal system very intercultural in its quest for judicial identity. As 
to the personnel, the text of the decree did not stipulate that any legal training 
was necessary at Parish Court level; each was composed of three elected judges, 
8  A writ is a court order; a writ of certiorari is issued by an appellate court, at its discretion, directing 
a lower court to deliver a record for review. A writ of prohibition is issued by a higher court to prevent 
a lower court from exceeding its jurisdiction or to prevent a non–judicial officer or entity from exercis-
ing a power. A writ of Habeas Corpus is generally issued so as to bring a person before a court, usually 
to ensure the person’s imprisonment or detention is not illegal (Black’s Law Dictionary, 2009 edition).
9  Literally “the body of civil laws”, a compilation of laws issued between 529 and 534 AD by Justinian 
I, Eastern Roman Emperor.
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most of them prominent IRA Volunteers or local Cumann na mBan leaders, or 
Trade Councils members. They were presided over by local parish priests. Each 
local authority (the Council) elected five District Court justices, who presided 
over the District Courts, except for the Circuit Sittings, which were composed of 
three legally–trained judges only. As to the Supreme Court, it was made up of two 
justices appointed by the Dáil and of four District Court judges. The Land judges 
were separate from the other personnel of the courts, in that they reported to the 
Ministry for Agriculture. The system was completed by the setting up of a Registry 
in the hands of a network of registrars, often lawyers trained in the Common Law 
tradition, who acted as civil servants under the supervision of the Ministry for 
Home Affairs. Their task was to copy down and collect court decisions and transfer 
them to the Ministry in Dublin. Their mission was rendered difficult as the war 
degenerated into a series of attacks and brutal acts of retaliation; the clandestine 
courts had to hear cases in makeshift courthouses that were constantly under the 
threat of British raids (Mitchell 1995: 207).This is a key feature common to war 
machines, in that they tend to act secretly (Foxton 2008: 187–190), and combine 
characteristics of underground State apparatuses and nomadic structures (Deleuze 
& Guattari 1980: 440). However, they kept serving notices to defendants and 
enforcing court orders throughout the war and after martial law was suspended, 
pending the signature of the Anglo–Irish Treaty that would put an end to the 
hostilities. This proved to be a real turning point both politically and judicially, 
first because it paved the way for the creation and recognition of an autonomous 
Ireland, then because, by doing so, it gave the newly–created State apparatus the 
means to deconstruct the intercultural identity that the war had helped create.
III– The end of Irish judicial interculturality: 
the Treaty and the Irish Free State (1922–24)
This period marks not only the transition between war and peace, but also the 
emergence of an official Irish Free State. Between the end of the military operations 
symbolized by the Truce signed on 11 July 1921 and the ratification of the Anglo–
Irish Treaty by the Dáil on 7 January 1922, the Irish provisional government 
underwent some major changes: first, all traces of “illegality” in the process leading 
to independence had to disappear in order to acquire equal status with the British 
Crown in peace negotiations; secondly the passing of sovereignty – even in a limited 
form – had to uphold institutional continuity; and thirdly, nationalist feelings had 
to be won over this reigning–in of the war machine, and this took the shape of a 
“capture” by the Irish Free State, to the detriment of its newly–acquired judicial 
identity exemplified by the Dáil Courts.
1. From war machine to State apparatus; the formation of the 
Irish Free State.
The most notable effect of the signing of the Truce in July 1921 was the lifting of 
martial law and the end of armed operations between the belligerents and reprisals 
against the civilian population. It also inaugurated a period of negotiations with 
a view to finalising the passing of the Crown’s authority from Britain to Ireland, 
subject to a few important concessions, among which it was agreed that Ireland 
would remain within the Commonwealth, and that the island would be partitioned 
between the Northern loyalist province of Ulster (minus three counties) should 
the Province decide to withdraw from the Irish Free State within a month of the 
Treaty coming into effect.10 Besides, Britain would retain some sovereignty over 
specific areas like the lighthouses on the coastal lines as well as some ports. Most 
importantly, the terms of the Treaty should take precedence over the newly–
drafted 1922 Constitution of the Irish Free State. The latter was undergoing a 
dramatic transformation, from a war machine in the literal sense of the term to 
becoming a party to an official negotiation. Indeed it became necessary for the 
two belligerents to acknowledge the existence of the Dáil Cabinet while giving it 
the attribute of a government in the making, on British terms. Thus some kind of 
“exchange”, of bargaining, was being set up, which was designated to prepare for 
a transfer of sovereignty, but each delegation came to the negotiation table with 
different perceptions of what such “exchange” could be. In Deleuzian terms, an 
“exchange” can only be defined in relation to its “limit”, beyond which it loses its 
value and interest for the parties. The horizon is set on the “penultimate” stage of 
the negotiation, the penultimate item that serves as a litmus test for the exchange’s 
mutual acceptability (Deleuze & Guattari 1980: 437–438). For the British, the limit 
was set on the legal form that the government of Southern Ireland should take, 
which should preserve the symbols and structure of the established British regime 
albeit with more autonomy. The Irish, on the other hand, wanted to transform 
the country into a Republic, which would completely secede from the United 
Kingdom. This corresponds to another paradigm, that of the “threshold”, beyond 
which one moves from one type of social assemblage (British rule) to another (the 
Irish Republic), two different forms of State apparatus. In spite of these diverging 
positions, one common point emerged, and that was the necessity to create a 
structure of self–government for Ireland. It implied the transformation of the 
rebellion, of the all–out opposition to the British institutions, into a State that could 
10  The Treaty gave effect to the Government of Ireland Act 1920 (10 & 11 Geo. 5 c. 67) which pro-
vided notably for the creation of two Parliaments, one in Northern Ireland, the other one in Southern 
Ireland. Interestingly, the provisions under the Act were already obsolete before the end of the War 
of Independence, as the status of dominion was no longer acceptable in its forms for the Volunteers 
and the First Dáil, who favoured the creation of a Republic. The remaining provisions of the Act were 
repealed in 1998 with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement.
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only exist if it captured it beforehand and started striating the smooth, unchartered 
space where the nomads (the IRA Flying Columns and clandestine institutions like 
the Dáil Courts) roamed, and filled the vacuum, created by the war (Deleuze & 
Guattari 1980: 385–386). Due to the negotiations in preparation for the signing of 
the Treaty, most features that characterized the British justice system were officially 
reintroduced in Ireland; the interlude that had recently brought features of Irish 
judicial identity to substantial and procedural law was over. Judicial identity was 
meant to be confined to the political authority. However, the Treaty generated 
some ambiguities pertaining to the nature of the political regime that was being 
established, which postponed the disappearance of the Dáil Courts until 1924. 
2. The Irish Free State’s judicial system, between change and continuity
If the Truce, followed by the negotiations that led to the Anglo–Irish Treaty of 
1921 was a relief for most people, one crucial political issue was never officially 
addressed by the provisional Irish government at that time: which political form 
would the Irish Free State take within the framework of the Treaty and in time 
to be? The Volunteers had explicitly fought for the establishment of a Republic, 
and the word “Republican” was present in every political statement made by the 
Dáil Cabinet (Kotsonouris 1994: 66). In spite of the fact that the Treaty imposed 
the reinstatement of British courts throughout the country, the government was 
reluctant to dismantle the Dáil Court network because it would send people the 
signal that what they had fought against since the Land Wars was being recanted. 
The period between 1921 and 1924 sanctioned the coexistence of a dual system 
of courts, one Republican, the other British, to the effect that the Irish officials 
in charge of the administration of the Dáil Courts saw the situation was soon to 
become untenable (Kotsonouris 1994: 67–68). In practice, local law enforcement 
officers, mostly Volunteers, continued to challenge the jurisdiction of British courts, 
others hesitated in prohibiting Dáil Court hearings. The confusion created by the 
provisional Irish government (under Treaty terms) only emphasized the contrast 
between the two judicial identities that were competing with each other at the 
time. Two groups were actively participating in the dispute: on the one hand, the 
Volunteers and those in charge of the Dáil Courts, on the other hand, the legal 
professions and the judiciary who had been removed from office by the War. The 
Free State was emerging as a State apparatus from Treaty provisions and had to 
assume the role of the State authority within a British political framework, by 
organizing the transfer of British authority and guardianship of the institutions. 
However, the situation was becoming volatile: the Government of Ireland Act 1920 
provided for the creation of an Irish Parliament, but it existed already and operated 
as Dáil Éireann; the new legitimacy of the institution would be established by 
means of general elections, but the transfer of judicial authority meant that the Dáil 
Courts would be illegal under the new arrangements. To make matters even more 
complicated, the 1921 Proclamation by the Dáil had forbidden the dismissal of 
court employees and judges formerly appointed by the British: this power struggle 
between those who supported the Treaty as a temporary arrangement and those 
who rejected the very idea that Ireland could be anything but a Republic were the 
seeds for the Civil War that broke out in 1922. The newly–formed Irish State was 
necessarily shaped like any other State apparatus: it took the same arborescent 
form as the British State (Deleuze & Guattari 1980: 17), even if semantic differences 
aimed to underline the crucial differences between them, like using the word 
“Republic” as a signifier that had little reality from a governmental point of view; 
inevitably it gradually absorbed the judicial rhizome of the Dáil Courts and their 
distinct cultural identity.
3. From the Rhizome to the Tree: the end of judicial identity, and a new 
intermediate form of interculturality
As the budding Irish Free State was taking shape, it became essential to assert its 
authority across the country, particularly in the areas that had been controlled by 
the Volunteers; the issue was of political legitimacy, a concept that corresponded 
to a top–down control of space and implied the establishment of striated zones 
where this authority was exercised. This was a difficult process to implement: after 
all, the Irish State, whose binding document was a British Act, albeit approved by 
the Dáil, was endowed with instruments of sovereignty: a bicameral Parliament 
that could enact binding legislation, a Constitution that could only be superseded 
by the Government of Ireland Act 1920. Officially, the transfer of authority moved 
from the British, and within a British institutional framework, to the Irish, who 
accepted the status of a Dominion. In reality, this transitional period inaugurated 
the gradual establishing of independence for Ireland, who would draft a Republican 
Constitution in 1937 to eventually become a Republic in April 1949. Meanwhile, 
Sinn Féin’s agenda (“Ourselves Alone”) clashed with this gradual shift in power, 
as the matter was essentially one of appearances: for the British, it had to look as 
though they were granting rights to Ireland,11 while the anti–Treaty were ready to 
continue the fight for the official existence of the Republic, since the successive 
Irish governments (the first Dáil 1919, the second Dáil 1921 and the third Dáil 1922) 
were the emanation of the will of the Irish people. 
11  From a British perspective, only a Westminster Act of Parliament could give effect to any modi-
fication of the Treaty. The Statute of Westminster 1931 stipulated that the British Parliament was not 
allowed to legislate for the Dominions anymore.
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As far as the courts were concerned, the Irish government finally decided to take 
some measures to wind up the Dáil Courts in 1923, as the Civil War had begun 
its destructive impact on the fledgling Irish nation. On 8 August 1923, the Dáil 
passed an Act “to provide for the appointment of Commissioners to dispose of 
cases which were pending in courts established under the authority of Dáil Éireann, 
to establish a Register of decrees of such courts and to make other provisions for 
the purpose of winding up the courts aforesaid, and relieving certain hardships and 
anomalies which have arisen in connection with those courts” (Kotsonouris 2004: 
86). The parliamentary language implies that somehow the Dáil Courts represented 
an episode that had been both a necessity and an impediment to the establishment 
of an Irish State. It may be that the gradual return to the Common Law tradition 
had a lot to do with the training of the legal professions, the lack of time to devise 
a new legal system (both substantial and procedural), and the pressure from the 
political and military events during the War of Independence. The Act established 
a Commission that would take over the cases that had been referred to the Dáil 
Courts, both civil and criminal; it is estimated that their number reached 5,000 
approximately (Kotsonouris 2013: 28). What was never explicitly said in the 
provisions of the Act, or in its long title, was that the Commission had superseding 
powers to declare that a case was indeed a Dáil Court case and take it over; in 
reality it amounted to the temporary reinstatement of the said Dáil Courts in 
another guise. However the war machine that had willed them into existence had 
been absorbed by the State institutions, in spite of a long, protracted battle within 
the Government and Dáil Éireann itself and public figures like William Cosgrave 
expressing their faith in a truly Irish justice system (Kotsonouris 1994: 110). This 
reflected the rift within the Irish nation concerning the attitude to adopt vis–à–vis 
the Treaty and its legal, as well as political consequences. On 1 May 1925, the Dáil 
Éireann Courts (Winding–up) Act became operative and effectively transferred the 
judicial authority from the Commission to the newly–established court system of 
the Irish Free State. Again, what was to associate with these courts depended on 
a myriad of personal or professional interests: unsolicited women’s groups pressed 
for the non–criminalisation of children, following the example of Canada with its 
juvenile courts. Members of the polity (farmers’ associations, trade and county 
councils, the legal professions) were invited to make recommendations too. But 
this was indeed a far cry from the sudden, revolutionary setting–up of the “People’s 
Courts” in the wake of the War of Independence. The overarching position of the 
State and of the Treaty meant that justice in Ireland would remain firmly anchored 
in the Common Law tradition: according to the Courts of Justice Act 1924, the 
changes concerned the courts’ names, but the jurisdictions remained equivalent to 
their British predecessors; only the existence of a written Constitution evidenced 
the passing from monarchy to a Republic that would not say its name until after 
World War II. 
Conclusion
The sudden emergence of an Irish judicial identity, based on an assemblage 
of Brehon traditions, and influences from Canon and Civil Law was rendered 
necessary by Ireland’s struggle against colonial institutions. This motley rhizomatic 
creation only obeyed the logic of the war machine and adopted its chaotic and swift 
unpredictability. One may say that this enterprise was doomed from the outset, 
since the very idea of a legal system is the emanation of a State apparatus, whose 
aim is to control (striate) the territory of the polity. The Dáil Courts attempted 
to deterritorialise this striated space and give it an Irish flavour, but a mixture of 
circumstances decided otherwise. The history of judicial identity follows a strict 
pattern of recognition: in the words of H.L.A. Hart, the essence of the law is to be 
found in what the officials say it is (Hart 1994: 101–102) and this precludes many 
forms of discontent, be it popular or generated by dissident factions. One may 
also reflect on this short and intense moment of judicial experiment and wonder 
why interculturality in law is both marginally important and centrally non–existent. 
Unlike other sensitive issues like culture, language, education, it does not seem 
to need change to adapt to new political circumstances. Sadly, the Dáil Courts, 
otherwise known as the Sinn Féin or the People’s Courts were relegated to history 
books, since they were of little importance to the building of the current Irish legal 
system, so much so that leading legal textbooks do not mention their existence 
beyond their names, although they devote at least a few paragraph to the old 
Brehon Law (Byrne &McCutcheon, 2009: 27); this of course vindicates Deleuze’s 
remark that the war machine can never be part of history and of knowledge because 
it is part and parcel of a process of destruction that ends either in the abolition of 
the State or of itself (Deleuze 1996: 171).
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